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Abstract
This paper uses panel data on banks, for the period 1991-98, to test the existence of a bank-
lending channel in the Spanish economy. In order to distinguish between loan demand and
supply movements, several exercises are performed. First, we analyse the differential responses,
to monetary policy changes, of bank lending by banks with different size, liquidity and
capitalisation. Second, we analyse the response to an exogenous deposit-reducing shock (a tax-
induced shift from deposits to mutual fund shares). As this involves a pure loan supply shock, it
best solves the above-mentioned identification problem. Our results are mostly against the
existence of a bank-lending channel in the period under analysis. This result appears to be related
to the important role of many small banks as collectors of savings, meaning they have a large
volume of resources available for lending.
JEL classification: C23, E44, E52, G21
Keywords: bank lending, bank funding, monetary transmission mechanism
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1. Introduction
Although the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism –i.e., how monetary policy
changes affect the economy- has been one of the most researched areas in economic literature, we are
still far from understanding in detail how it works. In particular, one relatively recent strand of this
literature has emphasised the role of the so-called credit channel. In the case of this channel,
monetary policy affects the level of economic activity not only by modifying short-term interest
rates, but also by altering the availability and terms of bank loans. Since firms and consumers (at
least, some of them) lack perfect substitutes for bank loans, they will not be able to offset the reduced
availability of these loans simply by greater recourse to alternative sources of funds1.
Underlying this mechanism are market frictions generated by the existence of asymmetric
information among market participants. Two mechanisms have been suggested for monetary policy
changes to affect bank loan supply (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The balance sheet channel is based
on the idea that monetary policy changes can affect the net worth of borrowers, which, in turn, affects
the external finance premium those borrowers face in the credit markets. A decline in borrowers’ net
worth translates into an upward shift in the bank loan supply curve for those borrowers, due to the
existence of asymmetric information among banks and their borrowers. But this mechanism is not
specific to banks, since other lenders to firms or households are equally affected by it. The bank
lending channel, by contrast, is based on the existence of asymmetric information among banks and
their lenders. More precisely, a monetary policy tightening, since it translates into a reduction in
deposits, entails a lower amount of loanable funds. To the extent that banks are unable to offset this
reduction in loanable funds, due to informational frictions between them and their providers of funds,
there will also be a fall in bank loan supply.
The existence of asymmetric information with respect to firms and households is relatively
well established and accepted. But, the relevance of asymmetric information with respect to banks is
much more controversial. In particular, some economists argue that, in today's world, banks have free
access to non-deposit sources of funds that allow them to offset any potential monetary policy-
induced fall in deposits (Romer and Romer, 1990). However, others argue that at least some banks
cannot frictionlessly tap uninsured sources of funds (Kashyap and Stein, 1995 and 2000).
In this paper we focus on this specific channel in the process of transmission of monetary
impulses. The critical assumption for the existence of a bank-lending channel is the ability of changes
                                                                
1For one of the first formalisations of these ideas, see Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
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in monetary policy to affect bank loan supply, via changes in the availability of insured deposits.
Therefore, we can distinguish two necessary steps in the process. First, a monetary policy tightening
should reduce the demand for insured deposits. Second, this reduced demand for deposits cannot be
offset with other sources of funds without additional costs and, therefore, loan supply falls.
As regards the first step, nowadays, monetary policy operates mainly through changes in the
short-term market interest rate. In practice, increases in the short-term interest rate are usually
followed by declines in bank deposits. But this is because banks have tended to adjust deposit-
interest rates only partially to the change in market interest rates. This raises the important issue of
how banks set their deposit rates and how the way in which they do so is related to the interest
sensitivity of depositors. Are there any differences across banks? Is this going to change with the
growing sophistication of depositors? These are important questions for the future of the bank
lending channel that Goodfriend (1995) underlined and that we are not going to tackle here. From
now on, we assume that banks may not adjust perfectly their deposit interest rates following a
monetary policy change because there are costs involved in doing so.
The second step follows from the failure of the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) proposition for (at
least some) banks2. To offset the lower demand for insured deposits, banks must either increase other
sources of funds or reduce assets. If the M-M proposition were valid, banks should not have any
problem in raising uninsured funds. But if there are informational asymmetries, banks cannot
frictionlessly tap uninsured sources of funds. Liquid assets can act as a buffer stock shielding the loan
stock from changes in deposits, but reducing liquidity also has a cost if this is used as a buffer.
Therefore, after a fall in deposits, some banks will suffer an increase in the marginal cost of funds
and the bank loan supply curve will shift upward. This effect will be greater for small and less
capitalised banks, which have more difficulty raising alternative forms of financing, and for less
liquid banks that are less able to cushion the effect on loans3.
We analyse both the responses of bank deposits and bank loans to monetary policy changes.
But, our main focus is on the loan supply. In this respect, analysing the response of bank loan supply
to monetary policy changes raises the key and difficult issue of disentangling loan supply effects
                                                                
2 See the theoretical model in Stein (1998).
3 By less liquid, we mean banks with less liquid assets as a proportion of total assets.
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from loan demand effects4. To overcome this identification problem, the empirical literature has
shifted from the analysis of aggregate data to microeconomic data on non-financial firms and banks5.
Following the approach of Kashyap and Stein (1995), we, first, analyse cross-sectional
differences in the response of bank loans to changes in monetary policy. Under the assumption of
homogeneous loan demand across banks, cross-sectional differences in loan behaviour will be
reflecting supply effects. Moreover, if the bank lending channel is at work, we should find that the
effect of monetary policy on lending is more pronounced for those banks suffering from a higher
degree of informational asymmetries. This is the result that Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000) and
Kishan and Opiela (2000) obtain for the US.
However, this approach is critically dependent on the assumption of homogeneous loan
demands across banks6. In the case of Spain, because of the important differences in the composition
of bank lending, the differential response across banks might be reflecting either a genuine difference
in loan supply behaviour or a difference induced by diverse demand-side behaviour of the different
types of loans. For this reason, we have additionally checked whether the results change when
looking at the behaviour of three different categories of bank loans: loans to firms, consumer loans
and mortgage loans.
All tests based on monetary policy shocks are potentially subject to the criticism of not
having controlled adequately for differences in loan demand. Moreover, in our sample period, the
information content of these monetary policy shocks could be relatively small, due to the limited
sample variation in monetary policy. Therefore, we propose a different test based on the response of
bank loans to an exogenous shock to bank deposits. The particular shock we use derives from the tax-
induced development of mutual funds in the Spanish economy during this period. The advantage of
this “mutual funds shock” is that, being a deposit-reducing shock, there is no reason to expect it to
affect loan demand. Therefore, any impact of the shock to loan growth can be safely interpreted as a
supply effect and, consequently, it can be taken as evidence in favour of the so-called second
necessary step of the bank-lending channel.
We have performed all these exercises with a panel of 216 banks operating in Spain over the
period 1991-1998. Although we observe some features in the balance sheet structure of the Spanish
                                                                
4 The loan demand effect is the usual reduction in loan demand as a result of the general increase in interest rates after
a monetary policy tightening. This would be the interest rate channel. What we are looking for is an additional channel
specifically related to the supply of bank loans relative to other sources of funds.
5 For a good summary of the debate on the lending view see Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000). And for a survey
including results for European countries see Mojon (1999).
6 That is the reason why Kashyap and Stein (2000) focused only on the small banks.
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banks that are consistent with the existence of informational frictions for the smaller banks 7, our
results are mostly unfavourable to the existence of distributional effects related to the bank lending
channel in the period considered. We find that the bank lending reaction to a monetary policy shock
is, if anything, more pronounced in the case of the less liquid banks, but there are no significant
differences according to either size or capitalisation. Results are even weaker when analysing the
response of the different loan categories. Moreover, we find that the shift from deposits to mutual
funds did not translate into a fall in credit even for the small, less liquid and less capitalised banks.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the main developments and
characteristics of the Spanish economy and banking system in the 1990s. This serves as a background
for the rest of the analysis. Section 3 describes the database and the variables used, while Section 4
discusses the econometric methodological approach that we use to test for the existence of a bank-
lending channel in Spain. Section 5 then presents the results for the basic loan and deposit equations
and Section 6 reports the results of the analysis of loan responses by type of loan. Section 7 analyses
the effects of mutual fund development on bank loans and bank balance sheets and, finally, Section 8
concludes.
2. Characteristics of and developments in the Spanish banking system and the Spanish
economy in the 1990s
2.1. Characteristics of the Spanish banking system
The Spanish financial system is clearly bank-dominated, which is why the analysis of banks’
response to monetary policy is so important in Spain. According to the Spanish Financial Accounts,
in 1998, credit institutions accounted for 66% of the total financial assets of all financial institutions.
Of the remaining 34%, 14% were accounted for by mutual funds, of which 90% corresponded to
funds managed by companies belonging to banking groups. These also have important market shares
in the businesses relating to securities and insurance markets, in accordance with the universal
banking model prevailing in the Spanish economy.
The relevance of banks is also clear from the point of view of the borrowers. Loans from
Spanish credit institutions accounted for 44% of the total financial liabilities of non-financial firms
(excluding shares). That is, more than seven times the amount of securities other than shares issued
                                                                
7 In particular, small banks are notably more dependent on deposit financing than medium or large banks.
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by Spanish non-financial firms. As regards households, 63% of their total financial liabilities are
bank loans from Spanish credit institutions.
Some banks also have significant strategic shareholdings in non-financial Spanish firms,
although these only account for less than 2% of the total assets of the Spanish banking system.
In this paper, we focus on the Spanish deposit-money institutions, since other kinds of credit
institution are much less important quantitatively 8 and from the point of view of the bank lending
channel, since they are not allowed to raise funds from the public in the form of deposits.
Among the Spanish deposit-money institutions, three different institutional groups can be
distinguished: commercial banks, savings banks and co-operative banks. Although regulatory
differences in the operations they can perform vanished more than a decade ago, there are still
important differences between them at the institutional level and in their business specialisation,
which may help give rise to different responses after monetary policy shocks. Commercial banks are
public limited companies, more focused on corporate business. The traditional business of savings
banks and co-operative banks has been, in contrast, that of collecting savings, mainly from
households, and granting loans to households and small and medium-sized firms; in the first case,
particularly in the form of mortgage loans. Savings banks are private foundations controlled -to
different degrees in each institution- by representatives of regional governments, employees,
depositors and founding institutions. Although this means some degree of governmental control,
there are no special government guarantees or -since 1989- special regulations affecting these banks.
As regards co-operative banks, these are owned by their members and subject to some limited
restrictions on their operations. Generally, they are very small and, despite their number, only
account for less than 5% of total assets and loans and less than 8% of total deposits. Savings banks,
by contrast, had a 53% share of the deposit market and 42% of the loan market in 1998, around 10
p.p. above the levels of a decade earlier. The expansion of savings banks has mainly been due to the
elimination of some remaining geographical barriers at the end of the 1980s and to the faster growth
of their traditional business. Although there is some degree of co-operation between groups of
savings banks and co-operative banks, this is relatively loose and each entity operates basically
according to its own means.
Each group of institutions has its own deposit insurance fund, which basically covers all non-
bank depositors up to a relatively low amount of EUR 15,000 in 1998 (EUR 9,000 in 1988).
Nevertheless, there were very few bank failures in the period under consideration and, with the
                                                                
8 They account for a declining share of the loan market that does not exceed 12% in our sample.
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exception of the crisis at a big bank in 1993, all of them affected very small banks. The crisis in 1993
was resolved through government intervention and subsequent sale to another private bank, thereby
avoiding any loss for any kind of depositor.
Competition between Spanish banks increased considerably during the 1990s, stimulated by
the entry of foreign banks, the removal of the remaining restrictions on the geographical expansion of
savings banks, technological advances and the process of integration of the Spanish economy in
Europe. As a result of this, the average net interest margin (net interest income over total assets) fell
from around 4% at the beginning of the decade to slightly above 2% at the end. Also, there was a
process of consolidation leading to a decline in the number of institutions operating in Spain.
Between 1988 and 1998, the number of savings banks and co-operative banks fell from 79 and 117,
respectively, to 51 and 97. The number of commercial banks actually increased in the same period
because the entry of foreign institutions more than offset the consolidation among domestic
institutions, including the biggest ones.
Other characteristics of the Spanish banking system can be seen in Table 1. This Table is
based on the final sample used in the estimations below, which is different from the total population,
but can be considered as representative of the whole population of banks in Spain.
Out of a total of 216 banks, 61 are commercial banks, 57 savings banks and 98 co-operative
banks. Co-operative banks are very small (91% of them are under the 50th percentile for size) and
account for 6% of total deposits (5% of total loans) against 52% (46%) and 42% (50%) for savings
banks and commercial banks, respectively. However, most of the commercial and savings banks are
also very small. Thus, while 75% of the observations corresponding to the smaller banks account for
14% of total assets, the largest 10% of banks account for 67%. Concentration is lower for loans and
deposits but still very high.
Small banks tend to have more liquid assets and capital, and to be more dependent on deposit
financing9. Thus, while only 4% of bank liabilities for the group of smaller banks correspond to
borrowing (interbank borrowed funds plus securities other than shares issued), this figure is 17% for
banks in the upper 10 percentiles. This may indicate that smaller banks have difficulty resorting to
uninsured sources of funds, due to informational asymmetries potentially leading to the existence of a
bank-lending channel of monetary policy. On the other hand, the higher liquidity and capitalisation of
smaller banks may be an endogenous response to such asymmetric information problems, thus,
reducing their impact on the monetary policy response of small banks.
                                                                
9 For the definition of variables, see the Annex.
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Co-operative banks are particularly well capitalised and liquid, with around half of them
having a capitalisation of above 10% and more than 40% of their assets as liquid assets. This latter
result is particularly significant, since it means that these banks maintain an extraordinary buffer of
liquid assets in their portfolios.
As regards the loan portfolio composition, mortgage loans and loans to households in general
are much more important for savings banks and co-operative banks than for commercial banks (the
latter channel, on average, 73% of their lending to firms). It is also important to bear this in mind
since, as we will see below, different types of loan behaved differently during our sample period10.
2.2. Economic developments during the 1990s
Figure 1 summarises the main macroeconomic developments in the Spanish economy during
the 1990s. After strong growth at the end of the 1980s, the economy slowed down, reaching a trough
in 1993, recovering thereafter to record 3% average real GDP growth between 1995 and 1998. As
regards inflation, inflationary pressures at the end of the 1980s were followed by a steadily declining
trend during the 1990s. This helps explain the declining trend also seen in nominal short-term interest
rates.
Since 1990, there have been only two periods of monetary policy tightening. The first one, in
1992, was associated with the crises in the European Monetary System (EMS) of that year. The
second one, in the first half of 1995, was associated with some signs of inflationary pressure just
when the new inflation-targeting monetary policy strategy of the Bank of Spain started to be applied.
In both cases, monetary policy tightening was relatively limited and short-lived. Short-term interest
rates went up by between 1.5 and 2 percentage points, and returned to their original level in less than
one and a half years. This may limit our ability to capture adequately the response of bank loans to a
monetary policy tightening and should be taken into account when interpreting the results below.
Turning to loan growth, this has been clearly pro-cyclical, with real growth above 10% in the
expansionary phases (see Figure 2). But two points are worth mentioning in this respect.  First, the
steep fall in loan growth between 1989 and 1990 resulted from the introduction of direct credit
restrictions by the Bank of Spain. Faced with strong economic and loan growth, increasing inflation
rates and restrictions on its capacity to increase interest rates because of the exchange rate
commitments implied by the EMS, the Bank of Spain announced, in July 1989, a ceiling on the rate
                                                                
10 The importance of differences in bank specialisation for the analysis of their behaviour is well documented in Saéz,
Sánchez and Sastre (1994) and Sánchez and Sastre (1995). Manzano and Galmés (1996) show how this affects, in particular,
the pricing policies of Spanish banks. See also Sastre (1998).
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of growth of loans to the end of that year. A new lower ceiling was announced later on for the year
1990. Although the restrictions were not formally imposed, they were very effective in pulling down
loan growth11, and when they disappeared, at the beginning of 1991, the economy was slowing down
and loan growth did not surge. The difficulty in capturing this effect adequately explains why, in the
analysis below, we do not take into account the years before 199112. Second, as Figure 3 clearly
shows, different types of loan behaved differently. While loans to firms reached negative growth
rates in the trough, mortgage loans never grew by less than 14% (in nominal terms), averaging annual
growth of 21.4% over the whole period. That is to say mortgage loans were clearly less pro-cyclical
than consumer loans and, especially, loans to firms.
With respect to deposits (see Figure 2), they were less pro-cyclical than loans and their
behaviour was affected by some particular events. Thus, the extraordinary growth of deposits around
1990 and 1991 was boosted by strong competition among banks on time-deposit interest rates at that
time. On the other hand, the lower growth around 1992-93 and 1997-98 can be explained by a
process of substitution of mutual fund shares for bank deposits. This process of substitution was
triggered by changes in the tax treatment of capital gains on mutual fund shares. Taxes on those
capital gains were lowered twice in the decade ; first in 1991 and then in 1996. The process of
substitution was very intense (see Figures 4 and 5) and led by banks, that, through affiliates,
dominated the market for management of those mutual funds. But it also had strong implications for
banks, which faced a lower demand for deposits. We will say more about this below since we take
advantage of this particular phenomenon to test the assumptions behind the bank-lending channel of
monetary policy.
The different cyclical behaviour of loans and deposits helps explain movements in the
average liquidity of banks. Figures 6a and 6b show, for each period, the mean and median of liquidity
and capitalisation of the banks included in the final sample used in the regressions. Average liquidity
increased during the cyclical downturn, reaching a maximum of around 35% of total assets in the
years from 1994 to 1996. Since then, it has declined steadily towards levels of around 25%. This
means that liquidity acts as a buffer. When loan demand growth falls behind deposit growth, banks
accumulate the excess funds as liquid assets (mainly, government securities). Thus, the deposit
business is not just a business deriving solely from the need to fund loans, but, at least for some
banks, a business in itself. This is important since it means that liquidity need not be just at the
minimum necessary for precautionary motives. For those banks for which the business of collecting
                                                                
11 However, part of this financing was simply replaced temporarily by lending through short-tem securities issued by firms.
12 Note that since the ceiling was the same across the board, the impact should have been different for each bank
depending on the loan growth rates they had recorded prior to the introduction of the restrictions.
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deposits is more important (mainly, savings banks and co-operative banks in the case of Spain)
liquidity may be well above the minimum precautionary level, and therefore, a reduction in deposits
may not necessarily lead to a fall in loan supply, as the bank-lending channel assumes. Finally, with
respect to average capitalisation there is no clear cyclical pattern (see Figure 6b).
3. Data
The data used in this paper come from the bank statements reported to the Banco de España
by all Spanish deposit-money institutions. Given the aim of this paper, we focus on all deposit-
money institutions apart from branches of foreign banks 13. Initially, we have observations for the
period 1988-1998.However, to avoid the problems generated by the existence of direct credit
restrictions in 1989 and 1990 (see Section 2), the observations prior to 1991 are excluded from the
analysis. The choice of 1998 as the end of the sample period is determined by the start of the single
monetary policy in the euro area in 1999. We want to analyse the behaviour of the Spanish banking
system prior to this potentially structural change. Therefore, the initial sample considered is an
unbalanced panel with 8,367 quarterly observations corresponding to 299 banks over the period
1991-1998.
For each bank and period, a set of variables is defined14. We are mainly interested in the
behaviour of loans and deposits. In both cases, we consider operations with the domestic non-
financial private sector. That is, loans to and deposits of the public sector are not included. As
mentioned in the previous section, all these deposits are partially insured (up to the amount of EUR
15,000 in 1998). We cannot separate deposits by size, and therefore these include both small deposits
which are fully insured and big deposits which are largely uninsured. As regards loans, we can
distinguish between loans to firms, consumer loans, mortgage loans and other loans, although this
breakdown is not available for all banks (see Section 6 below).
On the asset side, we also distinguish liquid assets from other assets. As liquid assets, we
include interbank deposits and securities net of repos. That is, we subtract from the outstanding
amount of securities those that have been repoed to third parties and add those acquired in reverse
                                                                
13 H. Pill (1996) finds that after a monetary policy shock, foreign banks in Spain behave differently from domestic banks and
actually increase their lending. He interprets this as evidence that foreign banks have greater access to external sources of
funds, allowing them to offset falls in domestic deposits. This must be particularly true for branches of foreign banks.
Therefore, we exclude them from our sample.
14 See the Annex for all definitions.
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repos15. On the liabilities side, three main sources of funds are distinguished: deposits, borrowing and
capital and reserves. Borrowing includes all uninsured market sources of funds (interbank borrowing,
excluding borrowing through repos, plus securities issued other than shares).
As indicators of the potential existence of asymmetric information problems we consider
three bank characteristics: size, liquidity and capitalisation. Size is defined as the log of total assets,
while liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets (as defined above) to total assets. With respect to
capitalisation, we use two alternative measures. The first one is the standard ratio of capital and
reserves to total assets. The second one tries to take into account the fact that not all assets are
equally risky. This is important in our sample since we have very heterogeneous banks, some of them
strongly focused on the traditional business of deposits and loans while others are focused on money-
and capital-market activities. Since Basel capital ratios are not available for all banks and with the
necessary frequency, we opted for a simple approximation based on the ratio of capital and reserves
to total assets excluding liquid assets and loans to the domestic public sector. All measures have been
standardised, by defining them in terms of deviations with respect to their average sample value,
except size which is defined in terms of deviations with respect to the period-by-period averages, to
eliminate the trend in average values.
The original dataset is modified to take into account mergers and outliers as explained in the
Annex. The final sample, after this cleaning process, is an unbalanced panel containing 5,551
observations corresponding to 216 banks, that account for 83% of the total loans in the original
sample, 89% of the total deposits and 80% of the total assets.
4. Econometric approach
Our baseline econometric model is a dynamic reduced form specification for both the
deposits and the loan equations that takes the following general form:
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where the variable z will represent either the log of deposits or the log of loans, x is a vector of
macroeconomic variables –the monetary policy indicator among them-, c denotes a vector of N bank-
                                                                
15 Cash and balances in the central bank are not included in our measure of liquidity, since they are generally limited
to the minimum necessary for operating reasons and to comply with regulatory requirements. Since these requirements
changed significantly along our sample period, movements in cash and balances in the central bank reflect mainly these
regulatory changes.
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specific characteristics and e  is an error term. This general specification is used to test whether there
are differences in the impact of monetary policy shocks among banks classified according to different
bank characteristics. For this purpose, some macroeconomic variables are included to control for
demand effects and the different bank characteristics are used to proxy potential asymmetric
information problems leading to a differential response across banks to a common monetary policy
shock.
As the model is estimated with quarterly data, we need to take into account the seasonal
properties of the data in order to satisfactorily choose the method of estimation. In our sample, both
loans and deposits present a seasonal pattern that varies across banks (Figure 7 illustrates this for the
case of loans), suggesting that, at least some banks face demands for loans and deposits displaying
very different seasonal patterns. In this case, seasonality is not adequately handled simply by
including seasonal dummies.
Thus, in designing our empirical model we take explicitly into account the seasonal
characteristics of the data (see Álvarez ,1999, for a similar dynamic and seasonal panel data model).
To allow for a seasonality that varies across individuals we consider the following structure for the
error term of the baseline model:
itsi
s
stit ud += å
=
le
4
1
(2)
where the dst are seasonal dummy variables and the lsi are seasonal individual effects.
We further assume that the aggregate macroeconomic variables are exogenous and that the
error term uit is uncorrelated with lagged values of the dependent variable and the bank
characteristics:
( ) ,0=sit xuE   for all t and s (3)
( ) ( ) 1,0 >==D -- kcuEzuE kititkitit (4)
To obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of equation (1), two specific features of the
model must be taken into account. On the one hand, the individual effects are correlated with the
lagged values of the dependent variable. The standard approach to deal with this problem –to
estimate a standard transformation of the model (first differences, orthogonal deviations,…)- is not
useful in our case given the seasonal pattern of the individual effects. On the other hand, an
instrumental-variable (IV) estimation method is required to take into account that some of the bank
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characteristics that are interacted with the macroeconomic variables (for instance, the liquidity share)
are likely to be simultaneously determined with both deposits and credit. In what follows we present
the orthogonality conditions for a model that combines these two features.
Given (1) to (4), and taking into account that 0dst4 =D and itit u44 D=D e , the following
moment conditions hold:
( ) 5,...1,04 -==DD tszE itis e (5)
( ) 5,...1,04 -==D tscE itis e (6)
Given the exogeneity of the macroeconomic variables we also have the following
orthogonality conditions:
( ) ,04 =D itsxE e   for all t and s (7)
Thus, to estimate model (1) we employ a GMM estimator that makes use of the set of
identifying restrictions given by expressions (5) to (7).
5. The response of total loans and deposits to monetary policy changes
In this section we analyse the responses of both total bank deposits and bank loans to
monetary policy changes. A necessary condition for the bank lending channel to exist is that both fall
after a monetary policy tightening. However, as already pointed out in the Introduction, a fall in loan
growth may simply reflect a lower demand due to the higher level of interest rates in general. To
disentangle loan supply from loan demand effects, we follow the identification approach of Kashyap
and Stein (1995). The basic idea is to look at cross-sectional differences in the response of bank loans
to a monetary policy shock. By controlling for possible differences in loan demand, the remaining
differences in the behaviour of loans among banks should be due to supply movements. Were these
differences to be related to indicators of the degree of informational asymmetries existing between
banks and their lenders (like size, liquidity or capitalisation), then this would support the idea of the
existence of a bank-lending channel.
The estimation results of the baseline deposits and loans equations are presented in Tables 2
and 3, respectively. More precisely, in these baseline equations, the dependent variables are the first
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difference of the log of total deposits and the first difference of the log of total loans to the non-
financial private sector, respectively16.
We consider the log of real GDP and the log of the CPI, among the set of macroeconomic
variables included in the model, to control for demand effects. The model includes the first difference
of the three-month money market rate as the monetary policy indicator, whose differential impact on
deposits and loans is what we are mainly interested in. Finally, we have included the
contemporaneous change in the ratio of the net worth of money-market and fixed-income mutual
funds to GDP in the equation for deposits to take into account the influence that the developments in
mutual funds have had on the growth of deposits. As bank characteristics we have considered size,
liquidity and two alternative definitions of capitalisation (see Section 3).
In order to identify differential responses of loans and deposits we have interacted the
monetary policy indicator with the bank characteristics17. If there is a bank lending channel, we
should expect a positive coefficient for the interaction of the monetary policy measure with each of
the bank characteristics in the loan equation. The response of the amount of deposits across banks
with different characteristics may differ, but the theory is not clear-cut in this respect. Finally, in the
case of deposits, we also allow for differential impact across banks of the expansion of mutual funds,
by interacting the variable that measures this expansion with the different bank characteristics.
For these baseline models, the dynamic structure is adequately handled by introducing four
lags of the endogenous variable, and the contemporaneous value and four lags of the regressors18. In
accordance with the discussion in Section 4, equation (1) –both for the cases of deposits and loans-
has been estimated in first seasonal differences using a GMM estimator based on the orthogonality
conditions defined by expressions (5) to (7). Regarding the statistical properties of the estimates
reported in Tables 2 and 3, we only find fourth-order residual autocorrelation, as was to be expected
given that the model is estimated in first seasonal differences. Moreover, the existence of residual
autocorrelation of other orders is rejected in all cases. Finally, the validity of the instruments is never
rejected, according to the Sargan test.
                                                                
16 Results do not change when we use outstanding loans plus unused loan commitments instead of just outstanding
loans, as a way of better capturing loan supply movements. Morgan (1998) finds that, in the US, loan commitments are
important to determine the dynamic response of loan growth to monetary policy changes. However, we are focusing on the
long-run effect, so that it is understandable that loan commitments matter less in this case.
17 Estimates with all the macroeconomic variables (real GDP growth, CPI inflation and monetary policy) interacted
with banks’ characteristics give similar qualitative results although with clear signs of overfitting.
18 There are two exceptions. For bank characteristics only the first lag is introduced whereas for the mutual funds variable,
only its contemporaneous value is included.
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Table 2 summarises the long-run impact on deposits of the different explanatory variables in
six different models.19 In the first four specifications, we introduce just one bank characteristic at a
time. In the final two models, we simultaneously include size, liquidity and one capitalisation ratio.
The long-run elasticities of deposits with respect to both GDP and prices are always positive and
significant. As regards the impact of monetary policy, this is negative and significant in some cases,
but far from being robust across models. Therefore, it seems that the evidence with respect to the first
necessary step of the bank lending channel is not very strong. Looking at the significance of the
interaction terms (fifth row in Table 2), distributional effects are found for banks with different
liquidity ratios: deposits of more liquid banks suffer less from the tightening of monetary policy. This
result might be due to the fact that credit co-operatives and small savings banks are among the most
liquid banks. To the extent that these institutions operate in local (and more concentrated) markets,
they may face, at least to a certain degree, a less interest rate sensitive demand for deposits. Finally,
we find that the growth in mutual funds has a clear negative contemporaneous effect on deposit
growth for all banks, although the impact is greater for large, less-liquid banks.20 These banks may
have put more effort into promoting mutual funds because of the higher share of their groups in the
market for mutual fund management and their lower share in the market for low-cost deposits. Also,
small banks might have been less affected because of a lower interest-rate sensitivity on the part of
their depositors.
Table 3 reports the corresponding results for loans. The effects of the macroeconomic
variables are robust across the different models. The long-run elasticity of credit to GDP is always
significant and larger than one. The response of credit to prices is always negative and significant.21
With respect to the monetary policy impact, we find that, in all models, the long-run multipliers of
monetary policy have the expected negative sign and are significantly different from zero for the
average bank in the sample (according to each of the bank characteristics considered).
 As for the interactions of the bank characteristics with the monetary policy measure, in the
case of size, we never find a significant differential effect of money shocks across banks. On the
other hand, the estimates of the model including liquidity (especially in the model containing size,
liquidity and the second definition of capitalisation) show that there are differences across banks in
                                                                
19 The complete set of short-run coefficients is available from the authors upon request. The reason why we focus on
the analysis of the estimated long-run coefficients is that, in some instances, the short-run coefficients display alternating
signs, which may signal a problem of overfitting due to the high number of purely  time-series explanatory variables in the
model. However, long-run effects are more robust and economically sensible.
20 Large banks are also less liquid on average. Hence, both results may stem from the same cause.
21 This coefficient picks up both the positive effect of inflation on nominal loan growth and the potential negative
effects of higher inflation via higher nominal interest rates. This second effect is important in our sample since inflation fell
significantly during the 1990s (see Section 2).
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the loan response to monetary policy shocks 22. More precisely, the loan response of banks with a
lower share of liquid assets is significantly stronger than that of more liquid banks. Results are far
from clear in the case of both indicators of capitalisation given that the interaction terms are weakly
significant in the models including size and liquidity as well. Moreover, in both cases, the sign of the
interaction is negative, which suggests that when facing a monetary policy shock, well-capitalised
banks display a stronger response.
Ehrmann et al. (2001) report the estimates of the same model with an alternative sample
arising from an homogeneous treatment of data for the four largest economies in the euro area23. In
addition, they also report the estimates of a similar model in which the macroeconomic variables are
replaced by a complete set of time dummies. Comparison of the results in Ehrmann et al. (2001) with
those presented in Table 3 shows that there are some quantitative differences but not qualitative
differences with respect to the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables (including the monetary
policy measure). As regards the interaction terms, liquidity is even more significant in Ehrmann et al.
(2001), while capitalisation is not at all. For size, the interaction term is negative and significant in
some cases. Overall, the only robust conclusion that can be drawn from the interaction terms in
Tables 3 and in the results reported in Ehrmann et al. (2001) is that less liquid banks display a
stronger reaction to monetary policy changes.
The evidence provided by the estimates of the baseline models is not conclusive with respect
to the existence of a bank-lending channel in Spain in the 1990s. On the one hand, there is weak
evidence that deposits fall after a monetary policy tightening and some evidence that the loan supply
of banks with less liquid assets is affected more strongly in such a case. But, on the other hand, there
is no robust differential response between large and small banks, and between more and less
capitalised banks. However, this may result from measurement problems. Both Pill (1996) and
Sánchez and Sastre (1995) argue that the analysis of banks by size may yield misguided results
because of the importance of other bank characteristics correlated with size, like the type of
institution or the bank specialisation. On the other hand, results for capitalisation may be influenced
                                                                
22 In the model containing size, liquidity and the first definition of capitalisation, the p-value is 0.14.
23 Starting from the same original database, there are two main divergences in the treatment of data that give raise to
differences between the sample used in this paper and that used in Ehrmann et al. (2001). These differences are the
treatment of bank mergers and the trimming process. Regarding the treatment of bank mergers, they make a backward
aggregation of the banks involved in the merger while in this paper we follow the approach described in the Annex. As for
the treatment of outliers, the main difference is that in this paper we exclude all the observations with credit shares or
deposit shares below 10 %. Apart from the different samples, there is also a different definition of liquid assets, since
Ehrmann et al (2001) use the more standard but less refined definition of cash and balances in the central bank plus
interbank assets plus government securities (not adjusted for repos).
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by the mismeasurement of the relevant level of capital (e.g., Basel ratios instead of simple balance-
sheet ratios).
6. Analysis of the loan portfolio composition
A possible objection to the results of the estimation of equation (1) for total loans is that,
because of the important differences across banks in the composition of bank lending -i.e. different
types of banks concentrate on (specialise in) different categories of loan24-, we might be inadequately
controlling for loan demand in the baseline model. Therefore, the differential response across banks
to the shocks analysed might be reflecting either a genuine difference in loan-supply behaviour or a
difference induced by divergences in the demand-side behaviour of the different types of loans (see
Figure 3). For instance, the stronger response of banks with less liquid assets might actually be
reflecting differential loan-supply behaviour or might be explained by the fact that banks with less
liquid assets have a higher share of mortgage loans (see Table 1) and these loans are more sensitive
to monetary policy changes.
A first attempt to address this objection has been to estimate equation (1) for total loans using
bank-specific demand-scale variables for real activity and prices, instead of using the log of real GDP
and the log of the CPI. These bank-specific variables have been constructed as weighted averages of
sectoral indicators of activity and prices, with the weights given by the composition of each bank’s
loan portfolio. 25 The purpose of this exercise is to consider demand-scale variables that properly
control for demand effects arising from the different composition of total loans. The estimates of the
model with bank-specific demand-scale variables are reported in Table 4. The coefficients of the
interaction terms display a similar pattern to that presented in Table 3. Nevertheless, these bank-
specific demand-scale variables showed no information content additional to the aggregate GDP and
CPI variables26. Moreover, these estimates yield the result that the long-run effect of monetary policy
on total loans for the average bank is no longer significant27. Also, the alternative exercise of
                                                                
24 See the references cited in footnote 10.
25 As the breakdown of lending by type of loan is only available on a yearly basis for some institutions in the sample,
for those institutions we have considered constant weights over four consecutive quarters.
26 That is, when we add the difference between the bank-specific variable and the aggregate variable to the model
with the aggregate variables, those differences are non-significant in all cases.
27 One possible explanation for this negative result is the difficulty in finding appropriate scale variables for all the
types of loan. Hence, although the inclusion of bank-specific scale variables is a refinement of the model, their usefulness
would depend on the usefulness of the sectoral scale variables available.
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allowing for different responses to GDP and the CPI across banks with different characteristics does
not yield better results (see footnote 17 above).
Therefore, we focus on the analysis of three different categories of bank loans separately:
loans to firms, consumer loans and mortgage loans28. The main drawback of this approach comes
from the fact that the information on these loan categories is not available, on a quarterly basis, for all
the banks. In particular, this is the case for most co-operative banks, for which the information
requirements are less demanding. When we remove from the sample those banks for which the
composition of lending is not available, the size of the sample is substantially reduced.29 Moreover,
the distribution of the sample according to the bank characteristics considered in our analysis is
significantly altered. As Figure 8 shows, we mainly lose observations of banks with a small size, high
proportion of liquid assets and high capitalisation, as these are the standard attributes of the co-
operative banks. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the range of the distribution hardly changes.
Although in a significantly smaller proportion, the reduced sample also contains observations
corresponding to small banks, banks with a high level of liquid assets and highly capitalised banks.
This feature may be behind the fact that, in spite of the significant differences in the sample
composition, the pattern of the results reported in Table 3 is reproduced when we re-estimate the
baseline equation for total loans with the reduced sample. Therefore, this is a valid basis for the
analysis of the impact of different loan portfolio compositions across banks.
Another potential drawback of the separate analysis of loan components is that there may be
idiosyncratic reasons why some banks, facing a funding constraint, decide to reduce one particular
type of loan while other banks decide to reduce another type of loan. In this case, we should not
expect to find significant interaction terms even if there is a constraint on the total supply of bank
loans. However, we think that this is not the more likely scenario. We assume that, in general, when
facing a monetary contraction, each bank reduces proportionately the supply of each type of loan or,
alternatively, that if there is a particular reason for restricting the supply of one kind of loan more
than the others, this will be common to most of the banks.
To analyse the response of the different loan categories, we have slightly modified the
baseline specification, the main reason being the difficulty in finding adequate demand-scale
variables for the different loan categories (see footnote 27). Instead of including a group of
                                                                
28 These three categories account for over 90% of total loans. Only other loans to households are excluded from this
analysis.
29 Whereas in the estimates with the whole sample (section 5) we make use of 4035 observations corresponding to
216 banks, in the estimates with this reduced sample, only 2100 observations corresponding to 116 banks are available.
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macroeconomic variables to control for demand effects, we estimate the model with a complete set of
time dummies.
Table 5 summarises the long-run differential impact on each type of bank loan of the
monetary policy shock (proxied again by the first difference of the three-month money-market
rate).30 For all types of loan, we never find any significant differential impact of the monetary policy
shock. More precisely, in the case of the models including the interaction of monetary policy and
liquidity, the interaction terms are always positive but never significant.
The absence of asymmetric responses by the different categories of bank loan to monetary
policy changes among more and less liquid banks suggests that the differential response of total loans
among these types of banks reported in Section 5 reflects mostly a loan portfolio composition effect
rather than a genuine difference in the loan-supply response. However, this result is not free from
criticism.  Therefore, in the next section we perform a different test based on the response of bank
loans to an exogenous shock to bank deposits.
7. The impact of mutual funds development on bank loans
All tests based on the analysis of the response of loans to a monetary policy shock are
potentially subject to the criticism of not having controlled adequately for differences in loan
demand. Moreover, due to the relatively short time period of our sample, it may be the case that we
are not able to capture accurately the response of banks to monetary policy changes31. Therefore, we
perform an additional test for the bank lending channel, which is based on the response of bank loans
to an exogenous shock to deposits arising from the tax-induced growth of mutual funds in the period
under consideration. The importance of this “mutual funds shock” in the sample period analysed in
this paper makes it very informative. However, its main advantage is that there is no reason to expect
it to affect loan demand, whereas, under the assumptions of the bank-lending-channel theory, it
should affect loan supply. Thus, any impact of the shock on loan growth can be safely interpreted as
                                                                
30 Although not reported to save space, the statistical properties of these estimates are satisfactory. As expected, there
is residual fourth-order autocorrelation, but the existence of residual autocorrelation of other orders is rejected in all cases.
Finally, the validity of the instruments is never rejected, according to the Sargan test.
31 In their paper, Kashyap and Stein (2000) analyse data for 17 years, while we have only 8 years, in which interest
rates follow a declining trend with only minor deviations around trend.
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evidence in favour of the bank-lending channel. 32 In what follows, we present in more detail the
arguments supporting the use of this second test.
As explained in Section 2, the shift of investors from bank deposits towards mutual fund
shares was one of the most significant developments in the Spanish economy in the 1990s. An
important characteristic of the process was that, during the sample period analysed in this paper,
mutual fund shares were very close substitutes for bank deposits. As is clearly apparent in Figure 4,
growth in mutual funds is almost entirely explained by the growth of money-market and fixed-
income mutual funds. Moreover, due to the poor development of private-debt markets in Spain, the
funds channelled to these mutual funds were invested almost exclusively in public debt –directly or
through repos- and frequently the portfolio had a very low duration. Consequently, they were very
liquid and safe and their return before taxes was not significantly different from the return on bank
time deposits (once management fees are taken into account). Therefore, most of the explanation for
the surge in mutual funds throughout the decade should be attributed to the tax reforms of 1991 and
1996, that reduced the tax on the medium-term capital gains generated by shares in mutual funds.
Only from 1998, with the consolidation of a scenario of low and stable inflation and interest rates,
and the increasing involvement of households in capital markets –also stimulated by the process of
privatisation of state-owned firms- did a significant non-tax-related demand for mutual fund shares
arise. Also, tax rules were changed again in 1999, this time reducing the tax advantage of mutual
funds over time deposits.
To the extent that, in the period under review, the growth in the demand for mutual funds
stemmed mainly from tax considerations, it can be considered as an exogenous negative shock to
bank deposit demand, without any impact on loan demand.
According to the bank-lending-channel theory, monetary policy influences bank loan supply
through its impact on deposit demand. A restrictive monetary policy reduces deposit demand, while
an expansionary policy increases it. In a non-MM world, banks would have problems in offsetting a
monetary-policy-induced fall in deposits with other sources of funds and, consequently, they would
reduce their loan supply. The negative shock to deposit demand implied by the development of
mutual fund shares should have had the same effect (i.e., an inward shift in loan supply for those
banks subject to asymmetric information problems).
                                                                
32 Insofar as the assumptions necessary for a monetary-policy-induced fall in deposits to affect loan supply are valid.
Of course, deposits should fall in the first place.
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To implement this testing strategy we use the change in the ratio of the net worth of money-
market and fixed-income mutual funds to GDP, as a measure of the mutual-funds shock33. This is the
measure used in the deposit equation of Section 5, where we find that deposits fall
contemporaneously with the increase in the net worth of mutual funds, for all banks. Although there
are some differences in the impact on deposits across banks, these differences do not seem to be
related to loan demand factors and since all banks appear to be negatively affected by the mutual-
funds shock, this is a valid basis for a test of the assumptions underlying the bank-lending channel.
We estimate the loan equation considered in Section 5 but enlarged by including the
contemporaneous mutual-funds shock and the interactions of this shock with the bank characteristics
(size, liquidity and capitalisation). According to the bank-lending-channel theory, we should expect a
negative coefficient for the mutual-fund shock and positive coefficients for the interaction terms in
the loan equation.  Table 6 reports the results of this test.34 This table shows that the expansion of
mutual funds has not led to bank lending growth falling in all cases, except when size, the liquidity
ratio and the second measure of capitalisation are simultaneously included. Even then, the shock is
only significant at the 10% confidence level. The interaction terms are never significant.
Therefore, contrary to what the bank-lending theory assumes, it appears that even those
banks which are more prone to suffer from an adverse shock to deposit demand –small, with less
liquid assets and poorly capitalised- have been able to offset the fall in deposits in some way. Thus,
there is no impact on banks’ supply of loans. This is very surprising since the shock to deposits was
quite big. According to the most conservative estimate (corresponding to the first column in Table 2),
e.g., the steady increase in mutual funds net worth in the last three years of our sample would have
meant, for the average bank, a fall in deposits equivalent to that resulting from an 8 p.p. increase in
the monetary policy interest rate.
In what follows, we study in more depth, what the response of Spanish banks to this type of
shock has been. In particular, we try to understand how those banks that are more likely to suffer
from a shortfall in deposits have altered their sources of financing.
The surge in mutual funds is concentrated in two main sub-periods, corresponding, more or
less, to the aftermath of the tax reforms of 1991 and 1996. The first sub-period, 1991 Q2 to 1994 Q1,
                                                                
33 This is preferable to a dummy variable due to the long duration of the process of substitution. To the extent that the
timing of the shift towards mutual funds could have been affected by changes in interest rates, this would be controlled by
the inclusion of the interest rate in the loan equation.
34 Table 6 shows the long-run effect on total loans of a one per cent permanent increase in the ratio of mutual fund net
worth to GDP. The long-run coefficients for GDP growth, CPI inflation and the monetary policy shock, not reported to save
space, are similar to those displayed in Table 3. Again, the statistical properties of the estimates are satisfactory.
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is characterised by weak economic conditions and loan demand. This weak loan demand allowed
banks to confront the shock to deposits without significant funding problems. The second sub-period,
1995 Q4 to 1998 Q4, is characterised by strong loan demand and, consequently higher funding
problems for banks.
Table 7 reports the cumulative changes in the main balance-sheet items for this second sub-
period, distinguishing among banks by size, liquidity and capitalisation. Column 7 of the Table
shows that, in all categories, there is a growing gap between loans and deposits as a percentage of
total assets. Part of this growing gap is cyclical35 and part of it results from the impact of mutual-fund
growth. Column 8 shows that this growing gap is possible because of the reduction in liquid assets.
Only large banks –and, to a lesser extent, some medium-sized banks- resort significantly to securities
issuance and interbank borrowing (see column 9). Although there are no causality tests here, the
evidence is consistent with some banks being more able to resort to market financing and, thus, with
the existence of informational or other kind of frictions for smaller banks. However, the existence of
a buffer of liquid assets appeared to allow even the less liquid banks to compensate for the
insufficient growth of deposits36.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to provide evidence on the existence of a bank-lending channel in
the Spanish economy over the 1990s. To this end, we have analysed both the responses of bank
deposits and bank loans to monetary policy changes. First, we have tested whether a monetary policy
tightening reduces the demand for insured deposits. The evidence on this is somewhat weak,
although this might be a result of the relatively short sample period available. On the loan side, we
have tried to overcome the identification problem of disentangling loan supply effects from loan
demand effects when analysing the response of bank loans to monetary policy changes.
For this purpose, we have followed first the approach of Kashyap and Stein (1995), by
analysing cross-sectional differences in the response of bank loans to changes in monetary policy.
We fail to find differences in the response of loan growth to monetary policy changes for Spanish
banks either of different sizes or of different degrees of capitalisation. However, we find some
                                                                
35 Due to the different output elasticity of loans and deposits, during upturns loans grow faster than deposits and
during downturns loans grow more slowly than deposits.
36 In the theoretical model of Stein (1998), liquidity also acts as a buffer to counteract funding shocks, but a reduction
in liquidity is not without cost. Therefore, the offsetting reaction of liquidity is not perfect and loan supply is affected.
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evidence that less liquid banks may display a stronger response than banks with a higher degree of
liquidity, although this evidence seems to be explained mostly by a loan-portfolio-composition effect
rather than by a genuine difference in the loan-supply response.
Moreover, we perform an alternative test, based on the response to an exogenous shock to
deposits, that has the advantage of better identifying loan supply movements and of being of greater
importance in our sample period. The particular shock we use derives from the tax-induced
development of mutual funds in the Spanish economy during this period. This being a deposit-
reducing shock, there is no reason to expect it to affect loan demand. Therefore, any impact of the
shock on loan growth can be safely interpreted as a supply effect and, consequently, can be taken as
evidence in favour of the bank-lending channel. However, we find no evidence that the sizeable
reduction in deposits due to the shifts towards mutual fund shares affected the ability of even the
smaller, less liquid and less capitalised banks to satisfy loan demand.
Overall, although the comparison between the balance sheets of large and small banks and of
their different balance-sheet responses to a funding shock points towards a significant difference in
the ability of small and large banks to resort to uninsured market sources of financing, our results are
mostly against the existence of an operative bank-lending channel in the Spanish economy in the
1990s. One factor that seems to be critical to these results is the role of liquidity. Spanish banks –and,
particularly, small banks- have maintained during the 1990s levels of liquid assets sufficient to offset
even very significant shocks to their traditional sources of funds. The reason why small banks
maintain high levels of liquid assets might be related to the role of main collectors of savings that
they have traditionally played in the Spanish economy. In some cases, it appears that this role of
collecting savings is more important than the role of funding customers. It is an open question
whether this characteristic of the Spanish banking system will persist in a future, more competitive,
environment and, consequently, whether the results found in this paper will still be valid.
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Figure 1. Main macroeconomic developments
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Figure 2. Bank loans and deposits
(annual real growth rates)
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Figure 3. Bank loans. Breakdown by type of loan
(annual growth rates)
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Figure 4. Mutual funds development
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Figure 5. Mutual funds and deposits
(% of total financial assets of non-financial firms and households)
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Figure 6a. Liquid assets over total assets
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Figure 6b. Capital and reserves over total assets
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Figure 7: Seasonal patterns of credit growth across banks(a)
(a) Each histogram corresponds to the distribution across banks of the “seasonal factor” of the corresponding
quarter. The "seasonal factor" for bank i in the kt h quarter is calculated as the difference between the median of
the credit growth of bank i in the kt h quarter and the median of the credit growth of bank i in all quarters. This
difference is re-scaled by the interquartile range of credit growth of bank i in the k th quarter to have an idea of
the statistical significance of the difference.
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Figure 8: Comparison of samples(a)
Whole sample Reduced sample
(a) Each figure represents the distribution for a specific variable of both the whole sample and the reduced sample.
    This reduced sample includes those observations for which the data on loans by type is available.
(b) Total assets in billions of euro.
(c) See Annex for the precise definition.
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. Spanish Banking Sector: 1991-1998  (1).
All
Commer. Savings Co-oper.
banks banks banks (<p75) (p75-90) (>p90) (<p30) (p30-70) (>p70) (<p30) (p30-70) (>p70)
Number of institutions 216 61 57 98 171 45 23 119 152 107 106 134 95
Number of observations 5551 1339 1637 2575 4175 837 539 1679 2223 1649 1679 2223 1649
Size indicators
Average number of bank-branches 187 342 296 37 62 261 1036 239 261 34 355 161 51
Average number of bank employees 1229 2807 1660 138 302 1726 7633 1488 1815 178 2348 1052 328
Average total assets(2) 3026.2 6867.3 4257.2 246.2 549.9 3857.5 20915.5 3299.2 4723.0 460.8 6262.6 2347.8 645.4
Median total assets(2) 592.6 1877.9 2042.5 82.5 233.6 3471.7 10760.2 1923.8 812.3 59.5 1712.0 635.4 55.1
Market share (%) of
Total assets 100.0 54.7 41.5 3.8 13.7 19.2 67.1 33.0 62.5 4.5 62.6 31.1 6.3
Loans 100.0 49.7 45.7 4.6 16.6 21.9 61.5 40.8 55.8 3.4 57.7 34.4 7.9
Deposits 100.0 41.7 52.4 5.9 18.6 21.9 59.6 39.2 56.4 4.4 58.0 34.6 7.4
Other structural indicators
Average total assets per branch(2) 14.3 15.8 12.8 14.3 12.9 16.9 20.9 15.3 13.6 14.1 13.7 13.3 16.1
Average total assets per employee(2) 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.3
Asset composition (percent of year-end total)
Loans 50.6 56.9 54.2 45.0 49.2 57.5 50.7 62.9 52.1 36.1 53.0 53.0 44.9
Liquidity 32.0 25.1 21.9 42.0 35.2 20.4 24.5 15.8 30.1 50.9 25.9 29.7 41.3
Other assets 17.5 18.0 24.0 13.0 15.6 22.1 24.7 21.4 17.8 13.0 21.1 17.3 13.9
Liabilities composition (percent of year-end total)
Deposits 72.7 55.5 73.4 81.2 76.1 65.8 56.7 68.2 70.9 79.6 69.1 73.0 75.9
    Sight deposits 32.1 26.3 33.9 34.1 32.8 31.2 28.9 32.0 31.6 33.0 31.2 33.1 31.7
    Other deposits 40.5 29.2 39.5 47.1 43.4 34.6 27.7 36.2 39.3 46.6 37.9 39.9 44.1
Borrowing 6.1 15.3 5.2 1.9 3.9 10.2 17.3 9.0 6.8 2.3 10.2 5.9 2.3
Capital & reserves 9.0 9.4 7.2 9.9 9.4 8.4 7.3 8.6 8.4 10.3 6.0 8.4 12.8
Other liabilities 12.2 19.7 14.2 6.9 10.6 15.5 18.7 14.3 13.8 7.8 14.7 12.6 9.0
Loan portfolio composition (percent of year-end total)
Number of observations(4) 3552 1339 1637 576 2177 836 539 1552 1496 504 1436 1476 640
     (% of the total) 64.0 100.0 100.0 22.4 52.1 99.9 100.0 92.4 67.3 30.6 85.5 66.4 38.8
Loans to firms 58.0 72.9 47.6 52.6 58.5 55.3 60.0 54.5 60.9 60.1 53.7 61.3 59.9
Mortgage loans 25.4 13.7 35.4 24.2 23.5 30.0 26.0 29.0 23.7 19.1 29.6 23.8 19.7
Consumer loans 7.8 5.6 8.9 9.6 8.0 7.5 7.2 8.2 7.1 8.4 8.2 7.2 8.2
Other loans to households 8.8 7.8 8.1 13.6 10.0 7.2 6.8 8.3 8.3 12.4 8.5 7.7 12.2
Source: Banco de España
(1) The analysis is performed on the whole sample period, so that statistics are averages for the 1991-1998 period. For this purpose, percentiles are calculated period by period, and each observation assigned to the correspon-
ding group in each period. This means that one bank can appear in different groups at different times. Hence, the number of institutions per group do not necessarily sum up to total. For all definitions, see Annex.
(2) In millions of euro.
(3) Capital and reserves over total assets (capitalisation-1).
(4) This information is not available for all co-operative banks. Hence, we report the number of observations with data in each group and the percentage it represents of total observations in the group.
Liquidity Capitalisation(3)SizeType
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Long-run coefficients Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Real GDP growth 0.540 *** 0.207 0.470 * 0.244 0.770 *** 0.206 0.653 *** 0.216 0.597 *** 0.200 0.347 0.235
Inflation (CPI) 1.651 *** 0.244 2.944 *** 0.415 2.112 *** 0.291 1.558 *** 0.260 2.658 *** 0.350 2.619 *** 0.355
Monetary policy(MP) -1.100 *** 0.293 0.527 0.430 -0.376 0.305 -0.829 *** 0.318 0.017 0.358 0.253 0.406
Mutual funds growth (MF) -0.564 *** 0.095 -0.480 *** 0.107 -0.539 *** 0.095 -0.575 *** 0.103 -0.539 *** 0.098 -0.577 *** 0.106
Bank char.*MP:   Size 0.015 0.059 0.030 0.080 0.047 0.079
                              Liq 1.786 * 1.009 2.589 ** 1.110 3.510 ** 1.528
                              Cap -6.173 5.221 0.195 1.679 -7.683 5.832 -3.087 2.495
Bank char.*MF:   Size -0.084 ** 0.035 -0.098 * 0.054 -0.095 * 0.054
                              Liq 1.725 *** 0.569 1.447 ** 0.701 1.776 ** 0.890
                              Cap -2.063 2.449 0.996 0.954 -5.658 * 2.903 -2.019 1.612
MP effect for:   large bank -1.039 *** 0.384 0.140 0.450 0.444 0.486
                          small bank -1.114 *** 0.296 -0.010 0.374 0.212 0.420
                          high liquid 0.936 * 0.550 0.610 0.454 1.056 * 0.569
                          low liquid 0.202 0.410 -0.455 0.399 -0.386 0.462
                          high cap -0.703 * 0.406 -0.802 * 0.426 -0.391 0.473 -0.177 0.522
                          low cap -0.160 0.361 -0.845 *** 0.323 0.285 0.412 0.499 0.460
MF effect for:   large bank -0.909 *** 0.154 -0.942 *** 0.224 -0.967 *** 0.224
                          small bank -0.492 *** 0.105 -0.454 *** 0.118 -0.496 *** 0.125
                          high liquid -0.086 0.161 -0.208 0.165 -0.171 0.198
                          low liquid -0.794 *** 0.156 -0.802 *** 0.180 -0.901 *** 0.220
                          high cap -0.648 *** 0.177 -0.436 ** 0.181 -0.839 *** 0.192 -0.858 *** 0.264
                          low cap -0.467 *** 0.114 -0.655 *** 0.118 -0.341 ** 0.133 -0.416 *** 0.152
Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value
Residual autocorr. tests
m1 0.513 0.608 1.047 0.295 0.336 0.737 0.119 0.905 0.942 0.346 1.334 0.182
m2 0.177 0.860 0.391 0.696 0.368 0.713 0.005 0.996 0.167 0.867 0.053 0.957
m4 -7.983 0.000 -7.853 0.000 -7.223 0.000 -7.894 0.000 -7.863 0.000 -8.106 0.000
m8 0.815 0.415 1.066 0.286 0.573 0.567 0.797 0.425 0.479 0.632 0.481 0.631
Sargan test (2-step) 196.507 0.755 189.461 0.854 201.240 0.674 193.488 0.801 188.803 1.000 188.043 1.000
Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
(*) The estimated model is given by expression (1) in the main text. The regressors are four lags of the endogenous variable, the first lag of the bank characteristics, the contemporaneous value and four lags of the macro-
economic variables (GDP growth, inflation, monetary policy indicator) and of the interaction of the bank characteristics with the monetary policy indicator, the contemporaneous value of the mutual funds shock and the inter-
action of this shock with the bank characteristics.
Instruments: macroeconomic variables (including the mutual funds shock), lags 5 to 8 of the endogenous variable and of the bank characteristics, and the interactions of the monetary policy indicator and of the mutual funds
shock with the bank characteristics at t-5. 
GMM estimation. Number of observations: 4035. Number of banks: 216
TABLE 2. BASIC MODEL (*)
Dependent variable: first difference of total deposits
B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP2Bank charact.: CAP2 B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP1Bank charact.: CAP1Bank charact.: SIZE Bank charact.: LIQ
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Long-run coefficients Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Real GDP growth 1.710 *** 0.355 2.027 *** 0.377 1.870 *** 0.358 1.551 *** 0.338 1.715 *** 0.339 1.490 *** 0.345
Inflation (CPI) -0.989 *** 0.325 -1.691 *** 0.437 -0.790 ** 0.377 -1.346 *** 0.349 -1.488 *** 0.409 -1.728 *** 0.419
Monetary policy(MP) -1.566 *** 0.423 -2.579 *** 0.512 -1.547 *** 0.466 -1.493 *** 0.413 -2.310 *** 0.466 -2.087 *** 0.493
Bank char.*MP:   Size -0.132 0.109 -0.109 0.144 -0.092 0.135
                              Liq 3.403 * 1.997 3.150 2.163 5.692 ** 2.213
                              Cap -6.045 6.979 -0.157 4.125 -14.836 * 8.152 -9.308 * 5.129
MP effect for:   large bank -2.106 *** 0.541 -2.755 *** 0.697 -2.466 *** 0.699
                          small bank -1.452 *** 0.454 -2.216 *** 0.499 -2.008 *** 0.519
                          high liquid -1.800 ** 0.732 -1.589 ** 0.659 -0.784 0.638
                          low liquid -3.198 *** 0.586 -2.883 *** 0.628 -3.123 *** 0.691
                          high cap -1.867 *** 0.643 -1.515 ** 0.749 -3.096 *** 0.678 -3.381 *** 0.946
                          low cap -1.335 *** 0.488 -1.480 *** 0.495 -1.791 *** 0.511 -1.343 ** 0.574
Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value
Residual autocorr. tests
m1 0.211 0.833 -0.165 0.865 -0.364 0.716 -0.123 0.902 -0.027 0.978 -0.017 0.987
m2 0.282 0.778 -0.015 0.988 0.237 0.813 0.282 0.778 -0.077 0.939 0.017 0.987
m4 -9.074 0.000 -9.242 0.000 -9.040 0.000 -9.020 0.000 -9.081 0.000 -9.020 0.000
m8 -0.229 0.819 0.295 0.768 -0.413 0.679 -0.232 0.816 -0.229 0.819 -0.321 0.748
Sargan test (2-step) 197.367 0.741 192.760 0.811 193.844 0.796 196.273 0.759 195.835 1.000 192.762 1.000
Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
(*) The estimated model is given by expression (1) in the main text. The regressors are four lags of the endogenous variable, the first lag of the bank characteristics and the contemporaneous value and four lags of the macro-
economic variables (GDP growth, inflation, monetary policy indicator) and of the interaction of the bank characteristics with the monetary policy indicator.  
Instruments: macroeconomic variables, lags 5 to 8 of the endogenous variable and of the bank characteristics, and the interactions of the monetary policy indicator with the bank characteristics at t-5.
GMM estimation. Number of observations: 4035. Number of banks: 216
Bank charact.: SIZE Bank charact.: LIQ
TABLE 3. BASIC MODEL (*)
Dependent variable: first difference of total loans to non-financial private sector
B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP2Bank charact.: CAP2 B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP1Bank charact.: CAP1
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Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Long-run coefficients
Bank-specific growth index 0.536 *** 0.109 0.340 *** 0.108 0.475 *** 0.114 0.602 *** 0.112 0.338 *** 0.104 0.376 *** 0.102
Bank-specific price index -0.362 *** 0.110 -0.195 * 0.109 -0.314 *** 0.114 -0.444 *** 0.113 -0.209 ** 0.106 -0.264 ** 0.104
Monetary policy(MP) -0.095 0.278 -0.003 0.234 0.158 0.259 0.077 0.265 -0.104 0.250 -0.056 0.240
Bank char.*MP:   Size -0.124 0.132 -0.164 0.150 -0.129 0.143
                              Liq 2.693 2.134 1.788 2.169 4.864 ** 2.281
                              Cap -6.620 7.940 -0.514 5.048 -14.161 * 8.329 -9.380 * 5.203
MP effect for:   large bank -0.604 0.528 -0.777 0.630 -0.583 0.617
                          small bank 0.012 0.331 0.038 0.299 0.055 0.278
                          high liquid 0.614 0.607 0.306 0.589 1.058 * 0.589
                          low liquid -0.493 0.382 -0.429 0.434 -0.941 ** 0.466
                          high cap -0.193 0.536 0.006 0.832 -0.854 0.520 -1.359 * 0.805
                          low cap 0.389 0.340 0.119 0.399 0.392 0.373 0.695 0.439
Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value
Residual autocorr. tests
m1 -0.590 0.555 -0.425 0.671 -1.358 0.175 -1.114 0.265 -0.832 0.405 -0.729 0.466
m2 -0.114 0.909 0.114 0.909 0.094 0.925 -0.348 0.728 0.162 0.871 -0.069 0.945
m4 -9.200 0.000 -9.093 0.000 -9.126 0.000 -9.120 0.000 -8.977 0.000 -8.883 0.000
m8 0.022 0.982 -0.117 0.907 -0.214 0.831 0.145 0.885 -0.577 0.564 -0.549 0.583
Sargan test (2-step) 202.409 1.000 196.712 1.000 197.834 1.000 201.835 1.000 194.371 1.000 191.031 1.000
Note: */**/*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.
(*) The estimated model is given by expression (1) in the main text. The regressors are four lags of the endogenous variable, the first lag of the bank characteristics and the contemporaneous value and four lags of the bank-
specific demand-scale variables, of the monetary policy indicator and of the interaction of the bank characteristics with the monetary policy indicator.  
Instruments: monetary policy indicator, lags 5 to 8 of the endogenous variable, of the bank-specific demand-scale variables and of the bank characteristics, and the interactions of the monetary policy indicator with the bank
characteristics at t-5. 
GMM estimation. Number of observations: 4035. Number of banks: 216
Bank charact.: SIZE Bank charact.: LIQ
TABLE 4. BASIC MODEL WITH BANK-SPECIFIC DEMAND-SCALE VARIABLES (*)
Dependent variable: first difference of total loans to non-financial private sector
B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP2Bank charact.: CAP2 B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP1Bank charact.: CAP1
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Dependent variable Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Loans to firms -0.494 0.628 5.406 4.842 -1.138 9.650 0.771 8.141
Consumer loans 0.466 1.036 10.483 17.849 -19.131 30.413 -12.065 28.197
Mortgage loans -0.028 0.573 6.225 8.940 -24.014 19.449 -15.278 12.721
(*) The results reported in this table are based on the sample of banks for which the composition of lending is available.
The estimated model is a slightly modified version of expression (1) in the main text. Instead of including a group of macroeconomic variables, the model introduces a complete set of time
dummies. Thus, the regressors are four lags of the endogenous variable, the first lag of the bank characteristics, the contemporaneous value and four lags of the interaction of the bank charac-
teristics with the monetary policy indicator, and a complete set of time dummies.
Instruments: time dummies, lags 5 to 8 of the endogenous variable and of the bank characteristics, and the interactions of the monetary policy indicator with the bank characteristics at t-5.
Bank characteristic
SIZE LIQUIDITY
TABLE 5. ANALYSIS OF LOAN PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION (*)
CAPITALISATION-2CAPITALISATION-1
GMM estimation. Number of observations: 2100. Number of banks: 116
Long-run coefficients of the interaction terms
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Long-run coefficients Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Mutual funds growth (MF) -0.062 0.142 -0.222 0.149 -0.083 0.142 -0.197 0.140 -0.174 0.137 -0.245 * 0.139
Bank char.*MF:   Size 0.018 0.057 -0.025 0.076 -0.015 0.073
                              Liq -1.155 0.960 -0.837 1.043 -0.180 1.206
                              Cap -0.888 3.801 -1.445 1.717 -1.865 4.475 -1.092 2.432
(*) The estimated model is given by expression (1) in the main text. The regressors are four lags of the endogenous variable, the first lag of the bank characteristics, the contemporaneous value and four lags of the macroeco-
nomic variables (GDP growth, inflation, monetary policy indicator) and of the interaction of the bank characteristics with the monetary policy indicator, the  contemporaneous value of the mutual funds shock and the inter-
action of this shock with the bank characteristics.
Instruments: macroeconomic variables (including the mutual funds shock), lags 5 to 8 of the endogenous variable and of the bank characteristics, and the interactions of the monetary policy indicator and of the mutual funds
shock with the bank characteristics at t-5. 
GMM estimation. Number of observations: 4035. Number of banks: 216
Bank charact.: SIZE Bank charact.: LIQ
TABLE 6. THE IMPACT OF THE MUTUAL FUNDS SHOCK (*)
Dependent variable: first difference of total loans to non-financial private sector
B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP2Bank charact.: CAP2 B.ch.: SIZE,LIQ,CAP1Bank charact.: CAP1
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N. 0117 37
TABLE 7: IMPACT OF MUTUAL-FUNDS' GROWTH ON BANKS' BALANCE SHEETS (1995Q4-1998Q4).
No. of total liquid capital & credit- liquid borrowing capital & other
Groups (a) banks (b) assets(d) assets(e) reser.(e) Credit Deposits deposit(e) assets(e) (e)(f) reser.(e) items(e)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dependent banks 20 3939 0.30 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.19 -0.13 0.06 0.01 -0.05
Small banks
    Low liq 25 276 0.30 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00
    Average liq 24 136 0.45 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.12 0.01 0.01 -0.01
    High liq 24 88 0.59 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.10 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Low cap 25 292 0.38 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.12 -0.13 0.00 0.01 0.00
    Average cap 24 136 0.45 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.01
    High cap 24 72 0.51 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00
Medium banks
    Low liq 19 2841 0.20 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.13 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.01
    High liq 18 1971 0.34 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.14 -0.13 0.00 0.01 0.02
    Low cap 19 2161 0.26 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.12 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00
    High cap 18 2689 0.28 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.00
Large banks 12 22930 0.26 0.07 0.58 0.57 0.13 -0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00
(a) Groups are defined according to banks' characteristics at 1995Q3. Dependent banks include affiliates of other banks plus two partially state-controlled banks. Among independent banks, 
      small banks are those under the 60th percentile and large banks those above the 90th percentile. The corresponding thresholds for liquidity and capitalisation, inside each size group, are 
       percentiles 33 and 66 for the small banks and percentile 50 for the medium banks. Large banks are not further split because of the reduced number of large institutions.
(b) This table is based on the data for those banks that remain in the sample between 1995Q4 and 1998Q4.
(c) At 1995Q3.
(d) Millions of euro.
(e) Over total assets.
(f) Securities issued and interbank borrowing.
Average cumulated change in:Market share(c)Average(c):
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Annex
Treatment of mergers
With respect to the treatment of bank mergers in the data, we consider three possible
alternative approaches:
· Option 1: Merged entities are reconstructed backward as the sum of the merging banks
before the merger.
· Option 2: A new bank is considered after any merger or acquisition. The merging banks
are removed from the sample following the bank merger.
· Option 3: Intermediate strategy. In mergers of banks of similar sizes (when total assets of
the merged bank are greater than 140% of any of the merging banks) the merger is
treated as in option 2. In mergers of banks of significantly different sizes (for instance,
when a large bank buys a small one), the data of the merged bank is considered as data of
the largest merging institution and no new bank appears. Growth rates of balance-sheet
data are adjusted in this case, to avoid jumps arising from acquisitions.
Option 3 is our preferred alternative and, therefore, the results reported throughout the paper
make use of the sample arising from this third option. Option 1 (mergers reconstructed backward)
allows for a high coverage but reduces the number of institutions and observations available. Option
2 (new institution after each M&A) can result in the complete elimination of an institution existing
over the whole period if it has been involved in several small acquisitions along the period, resulting
in there not being enough consecutive quarters available.
Treatment of outliers
In order to handle outliers and to have enough time-series observations available to estimate
the model, the following filters have been considered:
· Exclude bank-quarter data when credit shares or deposit shares are lower than 10%.
· Remove observations with nonsense values of the variables considered (e.g., zero total
assets, capitalisation ratio higher than one,…).
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· Remove observations in the upper and lower percentiles of the distributions defined in
terms of the growth rates of total assets, loans and deposits.
· Remove observations in the upper and lower percentiles of the distributions defined in
terms of the levels and changes in the liquidity ratio and the two capitalisation ratios.
· Remove banks without at least 9 consecutive quarterly observations.
Definition of variables
· Loans: loans to the domestic non-financial private sector.
· Liquid assets: interbank deposits plus fixed-income securities net of repos.
· Deposits: deposits from the domestic non-financial private sector.
· Borrowing: interbank borrowed funds, excluding funds raised through repos, plus
securities other than shares issued.
· Loan commitments: outstanding unused loan commitments.
· Bank-specific scale variables: sectoral indicators of activity and prices weighted by the
sectoral composition of the credit granted by the bank.
· Size: log of total assets of bank i at time t, minus average log of total assets of all banks
at time t.
· Liquidity: liquid assets divided by total assets of bank i at time t, minus average liquid
assets divided by total assets in the whole sample.
· Capitalisation-1: Capital and reserves divided by total assets of bank i at time t, minus
average capital and reserves divided by total assets in the whole sample.
· Capitalisation-2: Capital and reserves divided by total adjusted assets of bank i at time t,
minus average capital and reserves divided by total adjusted assets in the whole sample.
The adjustment consists of subtracting from total assets, liquid assets and loans to the
domestic public sector.
· Monetary policy shock: first difference of the three-month money market rate.
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· Mutual fund shock: first difference of the ratio of money-market and fixed-income
mutual fund net-worth to GDP.
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